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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CLIFFORD F. PARKER, DOROTHY
EDvV ARD and DOUGLAS ED\VARD,
Plainiiffs and Appellants,
vs.
GENgRAL M 0 T 0 RS CORPORATION, CADILLAC MOTOR CAR
DTYTRION & OWEN WRIGHT, INC.,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.

12718

RESPONDENT GENERAL MOTORS
CORPORATION'S BRIEF
NA'I1lTRE OF rrHE CASE
This is a suit for injuries resulting from an automobile accident.
DISPOSITION MADE IN THE LOWEH COURT
The procedural aspects of this case are unique. There
werP tlw usual preliminary motions. There was a Pretrial Confere nee and the case was set for trial.
Four days before trial, however, the plaintiffs, perhaps being the best informed of anyone of the weakness
of their ease, asked .Judge D. Frank Wilkins, who was
scheduled to try the case, to give them a rnling that their
1

-evidence, if offered, would be insufficient. The plaintiffs
wanted to avoid the expense of trial, yet soniehow preserve a right of appeal.
Judge Wilkins accommodated the plaintiffs and dismissed their case with prejudice.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant General Motors Corporation seeks affirmance of the Judgment entered by Judge Wilkins.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The original Complaint, filed November 16, 1966, was
bottomed in negligence. The allegation was that defendant General Motors Corporation manufactured an automobile with defective ignition and failed to use due care
in testing the automobile to discover the defect (R. 1,2).
Almost three years later, on Otcober 31, 1969, the
plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file an Amended
Complaint alleging theories described as "Strict Liability in Tort," "Negligence - Res lpsa Loquitur" and
"Warranty." Each separate theory was styled a "Cause
of Action" (R. 106-9). Leave was granted. (R. 144).
On January 26, 1970, all claims sPt forth in the
Amended Complaint were dismisst-'<l as to defendant
General Motors Corporation except the claims based upon negligence and as to those claims the allegations of
the Amended Complaint invoking the doctrine of Res
lpsa Loquitur were stricken. (R. 151-2).
2

On January 12, 1971, the plaintiffs requested a Pretrial Conference. It was held February 10, .1971, before
Judge D. Frank Wilkins. At that time
plaintiffs
asked Judge Wilkins to enlarge the issues for trial to
include those set forth in the Amended Complaint. Judge
Wilkins refused. Jury trial was set for June 14, 1971.
(R. 170-1). Later trial was postponed to November 1,
1971.
On October 28, 1971, fo-ur days before the trial, the
plaintiffs arranged a conference with Judge Wilkins and
again asked him to enlarge the issues for trial. When
this rPquest was again denied, one of counsel for the
plaintiffs made a statement which he termed an "Offer
of Proof" and requested an advisory opinion of Judge
'\Vilkins whether he would have established a prima facie
case of negligence if he establishM. at trial the facts
stated. After hearing the statement and argument of
counsel, Judge '\Vilkins dismissed the action. (R. 172-3).
No "facts" were before the court at the time the
plaintiffs requested the court's advice, only the statements of their counsel as to what it was thought the
proof might show. Counsel for the plaintiffs, not counsel for the defendants, requested this preview of the case.
Counsel for the plaintiffs were not precluded from
offering their proof at trial. At the hearing on October
28, 1971, one of counsel for the plaintiffs said:
"The only purpose for this appearance before
the Judge today was to eliminate, for the Plaintiffs, particularly, the expense of bringing in all of
their witnesses when they coudn't prove negli-
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gence. They were just going to go ahead and go
up to the Supreme Court on the legal question."
(R. 184).
In their Brief the plaintiffs do not complain of the
court's dismissal of the negligence claims. The "facts"
properly before the court in this appeal are, therefore,
the facts before the trial court at the time the Order
complained of by the plaintiffs was made. These "facts"
are those pleaded in the Amended Complaint. Although
a Motion to Dismiss tests the sufficiency of the pleading,
not the sufficiency of the proffered proof, counsel for
the plaintiffs made their proffer with respect to their
claims based upon the doctrine of strict liability, breach
of warranty and res ipsa loquitur (R. 186) and in their
Statement of Facts applicable to all three theories the
entire "Offer of Proof."
For clarity such "facts" as appear from the pleadings and the "Offer of Proof" will be set forth separately in our discussion of each of the Points raised in
this appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO
APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF STRICT LIABILITY
IN TORT.

A. The Doctrine of Strict Liability Is Not the Law
of Utah.
Utah has not embraced the doctrine of strict liability.
The elements of a cause of action against the manufacturer of an automobile were stated in Hooper v. Gen4

eral Motors Corp., 123 Utah 515, 260 P.2d 5.19 (1953)
where Chief Justice "Wolfe said:

"Thus, to impose liability of an assembler of
an automobile certain necessary elements must
be made out. Plaintiff is required to show:
(1) A defective wheel at the time of automobile
assembly; (2) Such defect being discoverable by
reasonable inspection; (3) Injury caused by the
failure of the wheel due to its defective condition."
The rule of the Hoo per case has been reaffirmed by
this court in Northern v. General Motors Corporation,
2 Utah 2d 9, 268 P.2d 981 (1954), in Hewitt v. General
Tire & R11bber Co., 3 Utah 2d 354, 284 P.2d 471 (1955)
and in JiVcblJ v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 9 Utah 2d
275, 342 P.2d 1094 (1950) and has been cited with
approval, although on other grounds, as recently as 1969.
11! m·sh v. Irvine, 22 Utah 2d 15±, 449 P2d 996 (1969).
The rule of the Hooper case is the law of Utah and
it should be reaffirmed in this case.

B.

The Doctrine of Strict Liability Should Not
Become the Law of Utah by Judicial Fiat.

Section 402A, Restatement of Law (2d), Torts, sets
forth the doctrine of Strict Liability in this language:
"§402A.

Special Liability of Seller of Product
for Physical II arm to User or Consumzer

(1) One who sells any product in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
5

consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate
user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of
selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the
user or consumer without substantial change in
the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies
although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible
care in the preparation and sale of his product,

and

('b) the user or consumer has not bought
the product from or entered into any contractual
relation with the seller."
Section 402A, supr.a, was published in 1965 by the
American Law Institute. It was an extension to all
products of the rule then applied only to food products
and products for intimate bodily use.
William L. Prosser, Dean of the School of Law,
University of California at Berkeley, was responsible
for Section 402A. He himself acknowledged that it was
a minority rule. In urging its adoption upon the membership of the American Law Institute, Dean Prosser said:
"No one has to be any seer or soothsayer to
foresee that this is becoming the law of the
immediate future . . .
"I would venture to predict that in anothf'r
50 years . this has fair chances of becoming a
majority rule in the United States . "
41 ALI Proceedings, 350-51 (1964-65).
6

An examination of the current state of the law in
the United States shows that it is still a minority rule.
To include more than one-half of the jurisdictions of
the United States requires inclusion of food cases, Federal cases speculating about state law and. states which
have adopted similar rules by statute.
The precise effect on existing law of adoption of
§402A, supra, is best understood in a historical context.

Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M & vV 109 (1842),
established the rule that privity of contract was an esin consential element of any action, whether in tort
tract, against a supplier of a product.

or

In ll!acPherson v. Bitick Motor Company, 217 N.Y.
382, 111 N.E. 1950 (1916), Justice Cardozo speaking for
the court held that a person who is injured by a negligently manufactured product may recover damages regardless of privity of contract. The duty to u8e due care
in the manufacture of a product was held to be owed to
the> public at large, not merely to the purchaser. This
decision was expressly incorporated in the law of Utah
in II ooper v. GPneral 11! otors Corporation, su.nrn.
In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358,
161 A.2d 69 ( 1960), New Jersey extended the elimination of the requirement of privity to cases founded upon
implied warranty.
Greenman v. Yuba Power Proditcts, Inc., 49 Cal. 2d
47, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), applied the
contract theory of liability (implied warranty of mer-
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chantability) as expressed in Henningsen but excluded
the traditional defenses to implied warranty cases by
calling the theory "Strict Liability in Tort."
Strict liability then is liability for injuries caused
by unmerchantable products, without privity of contract
and without the traditional defense of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, disclaimer or lack of notice.
Whether it is socially desirable to adopt the doctrine
of strict liability is a policy decision. In declining to
adopt this doctrine, the Court of Appeals of New Mexico
in Stang v. Hertz Corporation, 83 N.M. 218, 490 P.2d 475
( 1971) said :
"The issue presented, then, is whether
... is applicable in New Mexico. Plaintiffs candidly present the question as one of public policy.
They point out that more than half the states
have adopted some form of srict liability. • • •
They urge us to play follow the leader.
"In determining whether to do so, we are concerned with the policy reasons for adopting strict
liability, and rejecting liability based on negligence, as against a supplier of a defective product.
supra, states:
Comment c to
,. • • [T]he justification for the strict
liability has been said to be that the sellf'r,
by marketing his product for use and consumption, has undertaken and assumed a
special responsibility toward any member of
the consuming public who may be injured by
it; that the public has the right to and doPs
expect, in the case of products which it needs
and for which it is forced to rely upon the
seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind
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their goods; that public policy demands that
the burden of accidental injuries caused by
products intended for consumption be placed
upon those who market them, and be treated
as a cost of production against which liability insurance can be obtained; and that the
consumer of such products is entitled to the
maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and the proper persons to afford it are
those who market the products.'
mrhe decisions and the articles concerning
strict liability of a supplier have little variation
from Comment c, supra. Our summary of the
'justifications' for imposing strict liability, taken
from decisions cited in Hursh, su.pra, and articles
hert>inafter cited, is: as an incentive to guard
against defects; to spread the risk of loss as a cost
of doing business (insurance is included as an
aspect of risk-spreading) ; to avoid circuity of action; public interest in human safety requires it;
suppliPrs, hy placing their goods on the market,
represent that they are suitable and safe for use."

• • •

"Smyser, Products Liability and the American
Law Institute: A Petition for Rehearing, 42 U. of
Detroit L .•T. 343 ( 1964-65)
that the foregoing 'justifications' are conclusions for which
supporting data are lacking. Sandler, Strict Liability and the Need for Legislation, 53 Va. L.R.
1509 (1967) suggests that some of the foregoing
policy arguments are ineffectual and even conflicting. Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products
Liability, 17 Stanford L.R. 1077 (1964-65) suggests there are policy considerations in addition
to those summarized above.• • •
"Apparently, there is unanimity on one thingthat the issue before us is a policy issue. The
question then is whether this court is the appro9

priate body to make such a decision. Tl1e choice
of policy involves more than a choice between
legal theories.
"Obviously, economics is involved in 'riskspreading' and 'cost of doing husiness,' Prosser,
Yale L.J., supra, n. 147 at 1121, suggests the
validity of risk-spreading may depend on the size
of the defendant organization. 2 Harper and
James, The Law of Torts,§ 28, at 33 (1956), states
that injuries in the products liability area are
'increasingly attributable to large-scale enterprise.' Our limited research suggests that 'largescale enterprise' is rare in New Mexico. • • •
"Section 402A, supra, places no limitation on
'size,' regardless of how that term may be defined.
It applies to all suppliers. Risk-spreading, as a
justification for strirt liability, may not be sound
when applied to a one-man operation, or even a
large financially or competitively marginal defendant. See MagrinP v. Kra.snica., 94 N.J. Super,
228, 227 A.2d 539 (1967) aff'd Ma.grine v. Sprctor,
supra; Prosser, YalP L ..L supra, n. 147.
"Apart from economics, is the incidence of
defective products causing injury sufficient to
justify strict liability? We simply do not know.

• • •

"Comment c to § 402A, supra, refers to 'public policy demands.' These words seem more appropriate to legislative consideration, 'demands'
more consistent to contract negotiation, than to
judicial evaluation."
The court noted that "circuity of action" was not a
valid consideration with modern pleading and multistate process and then candidly observed:
10

"We are attracted to the idea that, as between
the injured user and the supplier of the def e-ctive
product, the supplier should be liable. Yet our
attraction is as individuals and consrnners. As
judges, a necessary consideration is whether we
are equipped to make that choice."
In conclusion, the court said:
"\-Ve judge neither the validity of the reasons
advanced in support of strict liability nor the
validity of the concept of strict liability. The issue
is whether
supra, 'vhich imposes strict
liahili ty on all sellers, should be adopted as New
1\fexico law. Since this issue involves economic
considerations, the consequences of which are
unknown, accident statistics which are also unknown and public demands which we are not structured to ascertain, we decline to adopt §402A,
supra, as New Mexico law. • • • In reaching
this result, we do not suggest what our position
would he as to strict liability when presented on a
basis more limited than the broad and rigid sweep
of §402A, supra. We hold only that the extension
of a seller's liability from negligence to strict
liability under §402A, supra, lies with the Legislature and not this court."
Maryland declined to judicially espouse the doctrine
of Strict Liability in Tort in Tewk v. Maszczenski, 237
A.2d 434, 248 Md. 476, and again in Myers v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 252 A.2d 855, 253 Md. 282 (1969).
In Christensen v. Osakis Silo Company, 424 F.2d 1301
(8th Cir. 1970), the court was asked to find the doctrine
of strict liability to be the law of North Dakota. It declined to do so, reasoning that, because North Dakota
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decisions uphold the validity of a disclaimer of implied
warranty, which is inconsistent with strict
North Dakota would not likely adopt the rule of Section
402A.
Utah has also upheld repeatedly the validity of a
disclaimer of implied warranty. Redmond v. Petty Motor
Co., 121Utah370, 242 P.2d 302 (1952); in Landes <f Co. v.
Fallows, 81 Utah 432, 19 P.2d 389 (1933) and in Hoover
v. Utah Nursing Co., 79 Utah 12, 7 P.2d 270 (1932).
These decisions and the holdings in Hooper v. Genr
eral Motors Corporation, supra, should not be overturned.
Their rationale has the same validity today it had then.
In Ramirez v. Ogden City, 3 Utah 2d 102, 279 P.2d
463 (1955 ), this court was ru.;ked to abandon the dl-'fense
of sovereign immunity. Justice Crocket speaking for a
unanimous court, said :
"Whatever its desirability or undesirability
may be, it has long heen firmly establishro in our
law by rulings of the majority of this court. In
deference to the principle of stare decisis we do
not now feel at liberty to consider its merits or
demerits. Any change would be properly within
the province of the Legislature."
C. The Plaintiffs Would Not Be Entitled to Recover Damages Under the Circumstances of This Case
Even Uniler the Doctrine of Strict Liability.
It is alleged in the Amended Complaint that in
May or June of 1964, Plaintiff Clifford F. Parker purchased from Defendant Owen Wright, Inc., a Cadillac

automobile which had been marn1facture<l by defendant
Gt>1wral Motors, that both defendants placed the automobill· upon the market for the purpose of having it
driven on ordinary streets, highways, and freeways, that
plaintiff Clifford F. Parker on February 20, 1965, was
operating and driving said Cadillac automobile for the
pnrposr for which it was reasonably intended; to-wit,
operating on highways and freeways, that the Cadillac
antornobile on February 20, 1965, was in substantially
the same condition as when it left the control of both
dPf Pndants, that while plaintiff Clifford F. Parker was
opPrating said automobile on Public Highway 40, the
autmnohilt>'s engine failed, causing the power steering
to quit operating, resulting, in the car going out of control
and colliding with several other cars including the one
driven by plaintiff Dorothy Edward in which plaintiff
Douglas was riding, that the Cadillac automobile in
question had a defective ignition and malfunction in
the primary electrical system, that these defects or the
condition causing these defects were in the automobile
at tlw time it left the control of both defendants, that
tlwse defrds were the rause of the engine failing in the
Cadillac automobile and, thus, the cause of the accident
(R. 106-7).
In tht>ir Offer of Proof the plaintff s said:
"The evidence would show that the plaintiff
Parker had the car for some two to three months
when a problem in thr primary electrical system
of the car manifested itself. The problem would
be that the engine would stop running while the
plaintiff was driving the car. The evidf'nce wonld
show that at the time th(' engine would stop run-

ning, that the plaintiff would lose the power
equipment in the car, which included power steering and power brakes. The evidence would further
show that the plaintiff took the automobile in for
repairs to the defendant, Owen Wright, in Layton,
Utah, some 12 to 13 times for repairs for the
same problem. • • •
" . . . [T]he plaintiff Parker went on a fishing trip up Parley's Canyon and on his return
he was coming down the canyon when the engine
again cut out, rendering the car without power
assistance, to wit: no power steering or no [sic]
power brakes. The evidence would show at the
time the plaintiff Parker crossed the center line
of the road in Parley's Canyon, traveling at a
speed of approximately 40 miles per hour, the
evidence would should that the plaintiff Parkt-r's
vehicle then crashed into the plaintiff Edward'i;;
vehicle or the vehicle in which the plaintiffs
Edwards were riding. • • • The further flvidflnc<>
would show that the service manager of Owen
Wright, Inc., wrote to the Utah Highway Patrol,
indicating that a malfunction in the primary electrical system, causing the engine to stop, would
not render the car without power aissistancp, in
his opinion. The plaintiffs would also intend
to producP expflrt testimony which would indicate
that the car was in fact defective, that
precise
defect could not be precisely located, and that
because of the short time the automobile was
driven before the defect manifested itself, that in
probability, the defect existed at the time of manufacture." (R. 118-19) (Italics added.)

It is not necessary in this case to decide whPther
Utah should or should not adopt the doctrine of Strirt
Liability in Tort. The p1aintiffs' "Offer of Proof" affirmatively shows that malfunction in the primary elec-
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trical system, the defect complained of by the plaintiffs,
would not render the car without power assistance. (R.
189, Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, p. 7.) It is common
knowledge that loss of power steering would not cause
an automobile to veer across the center line onto the
wrong side of the road. Nor would loss of power brakes
make it impossible to stop. Power steering and power
brakes assist the driver by decreasing the amount of
effort required to accomplish the desired result. The
systems function whether the assistance is present or
not.
The plaintiffs make no claim that plaintiff Parker
tried to steer to the right but was unable to prevent the
car from turning to the left. Nor do they claim plaintiff
Parker applied his brakes but was unable to stop.
In Shepherd v. Ford Motor Compawy, 457 S.W.2d
255 (Mo. 1970) the plaintiff claimed U-bolts came loose
permitting the rear axle to move rearward severing the
brake line and resulting in loss of brakes.
In holding there to be no evidence of causation, the
court said:
"Not one word of testimony shows Mr. Silven
even attempted to apply his brakes before the
collision." 457 S.W. 2d 259.
There is a vast difference between the considerable
steering effort required to turn the wheels of a stopped
car as in parallel parking, and the minimal amount reqni r<'d to turn the wheels of a car moving down a highway
at 40 miles per hour, as was this ear.
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In Jack Roach-Bissounct, Inc. i:. Puskar, 417 S."W.
2d 262 (Tex. 19()7), Dani<>l .T. Puskar, plaintiff, :·rnstained
personal injuries while drivi11g alone in a 1939 Thunderbird
manufactured by Ford Motor Company.
He had purchased the ve>hielt> nPw from J aC'k RoachBissonnet, Inc., hereinafter referred to as Roach. Plaintiff brought the suit against Ford and Roach to reC'over
damages for his injuries. 'rlH' trial court rendered judgment on the verdict in his favor and against Ford and
Roach.
The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed as to Roach,
but reversed the judgment of the trial court and rendPred
judgment that plaintiff take nothing as to Ford. Thi'
Supreme Court affirmed as to Ford but rPversP<l as
to Roach, holding the evidence insufficient as a matt('r
of law to show that the accidf'nt w:as caused by a manufacturing defect.
The plaintiff was driving the Thunderbird along a
graveled road. When 125 to 200 feet south of an intt>rsection, he saw a stop sign. He thereupon made a heavy
application of his brakes, but there was little or no
response. When the automobile reached the intersection,
plaintiff attempted to turn fo the right but the steering
wheel would move only a few inches. He was unable
to turn the vehicle, and it continued across a ditch and
into an embankment.
After delivery of the automobile the plaintiff proceeded to drive it and found that it operatf'd normally
with a few exceptions. The motor died once while he
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was backing out of the driveway, and the same thing
happened on several occasions when the brakes were
applied or when the motor was idling while the car
was standing in traffic. Plaintiff noticed ,that extra
effort was required in applying the brakes did not make
much difference. There was no reason to turn the steering wheel on any of these occasions.
Plaintiff telephoned Roach several times to complain about the performance of the .automobile. He wru;
that it was operating normally and was told
adjustments could be
to keep a list so the
made when the car was brought in for the 1000-mile
checkup. On Saturday, May 30th, plaintiff telephoned
Roach again and complained vigorously because nothing
had been done. He asked to be allowed to bring the
rar in, out was told that Roach could not service it
th€>n or on Monday. Roach instructed him to bring the
car in on TuPsday, which he agreed to do. The accident
occurred in the early hours of Sunday, May 31, 1959.
This was 29 days after Roach delivered the automobile
to plaintiff, and it had been driven less than 1,000 miles
at the time.
The undisputed evidence showed that a powereq uipped 1959 Thunderbird had a vacuum reservoir
which allowed the driver to make two or three powerapplications of the brakes after the engine stops
turning. Even when this reservoir is filled with air at
outside pressure, the driver has conventional brakes
which, if he applies to the brake pedal the force normally rrquired for a vehicle not equipped with power,
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will enable him to slow or stop his automobile as quickly
and effectively as with the power assist. It also appeared
from the undisputed evidence that the steering gear
ratio of a 1959 Thunderbird equipped with power steering was the same as that of one not so equipped. In
either vehicle one pound of force applied at the rim of
the steering wheel produces 30 pounds of force at the
end of the pitman arm. When the automobile is moving
at a speed of 30 miles an hour, approximately 150
pounds of force at the end of the pitman arm is required
to turn the front wheels. If the vehicle is equipped with
power steering, turning the steering wheel in either
direction causes the linkage to move and actuates the
valve assembly. This permits fluid under pressure to
flow to the appropriate side of a cylinder, which
part of the force required to turn the front wheels.
As pointed out by the Court of Civil Appeals, there
is no evidence of any defect in the conYentional braking
or steering systems or the power assist of either that
would cause the same not to operate.
Plaintiffs' proof in this case not only has the sanw
deficiency as pointed out by the court in Pu,r;;kar, but
affirmatively shows the contrary.
" ... [A] malfunction in the primary elrctrical
system causing the engine to stop, would not .. ·
render the car without power assistance." (R. 119,
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, p. 7).
A causal relation between the defect and the accident is a prerequisite to liability in cases inolving alleged
defective products. Pria v. Ashby's lncnrpora.tfd, 11
Utah 2d 54-, 354- P.2d 1064 (19GO).
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The rule is no different in jurisdictions applying
Strict Liability in Tort. Section 402A, supra, reads:

"One who sells any product in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer ... is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused ... " (Italics supplied).
See also 2 Frumer and Friedman, Products Liability, 3-218, § 16A[ 4] (1970) where it is said:
"In order for there to be recovery in any
product liability action, it is essential that the
palintiff be able to prove causation in fact. This
means, that the injured party must be able to
establish that the product was defective, that
the defect caused the injury complained of, and
that the defect can be traced to the defendant.
The principal difference in strict liability in tort
from negligence liability is that the element of
the defendant's negligence is not relevant. But,
as in a negligence claim, it is necessary that the
plaintiff prove causation or recovery will not
follow."
But
if this basic principle, fundamental to
all liability in contract, tort or otherwise be ignored,
Plaintiffs "Offer of Proof" is defective in another vital
particular, namely, it lacked any showing that the alleged
defect existed at the time of the sale by defendant General Motors Corporation to the dealer, defendant Owen
"Tright, Inc. It is a characteristic of all things mechaniral that they require maintenance. Perhaps the most
common r,ause of malfunction in electrical systems are
short circuits which may be due to a broken wire, loss
of insulation or merely moisture.
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Strict liability is not the equivalent of absolute liability and the fact that an accident occurred dot>s not
tend to prove that the product was defective or if defective, when it became defective.
In comment g. to Section 402A, supra, it is stated:
''The seller is not liable when he delivers the
product in a safe condition, and subsequent mishandling or other causes make it harmful by the
time it is consumed. The burden of proof that
the product was in a defective condition at the
time that it left the hands of the particular seller
is upon the injured plaintiff; and unless evidt>nce
can be produced which will support the conclusion that it was then defective, the burden is not
sustained.''
Expert testimony to the effect that a defect probably existed at the time of manufacture because it manifested itself three months after purchase by plaintiff
Parker is incompetent. The opinion of an expert is not
admissible when a jury is as well able to draw the
inference from the facts as is the expert.
"Opinion testimony . . . is .admissible only
when the subject matter is such that a jury cannot be expected to draw correct inferences from
the facts. There is no need for expert opinion
with reference to facts involving commonplacP
occurrences. Expert testimony is not admissible
solely because the witness has some skill in a
particular field, but is admissible, if at all, only
because the witness can offer assistance on a
matter not within the knowledge or common experience of people of ordinary intelligence." Dny
v. Lorenzo Smith ct Son, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 221,
408 P.2d 186 (1965).
20

The plaintiffs' phantom expert admits that the nature of the alleged defect is unknown. (R. 189). With
this admission he cannot be heard to say that the nature
of the alleged defect is such that if it manifested itself
within three months after the purchase of the automobile
by plaintiff Parker from defendant Owen Wright, Inc;,
it must have existed at the time of manufacture. Apart
from the logical fallacy is the total absence of any
showing of the time of manufacture.
At best plaintiffs' proof required "piling inference
upon inf ere nee" - an improper means of proving any
case. See Briner v. General Motors Corp., 461 S.W.2d
99 (Ky. 1970).
This car was a 1964 model. It was purchased according to plaintiff Parker in June of 1964 (R. 187). It is
common knowledge that automobiles of a given model
year are eustomarily offered for sale as early as September of the prior year. This car could have been manufactured as early as September, 1963. The accident
oc{'urred in February, 1965, 17 months later.
Any opinion that a defect of an unknown nature
must have existed at the time of manufacture because it
manifested itself in September, 1964, is illogical and
ineompetent. Indeed, absent knowledge of the nature
of the alleged defect, it is a more logical inference that
if it did not occur, it did not exist until it manifested
itself.
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In Clay v. Ensignr-Bickford Co., 307 F. Supp. 288
(D. Colo. 1969), the court was satisfied that the evidence
established that the premature explosion of dynamite
was caused by a defective fuse but held the plaintiff
had failed to sustain his burden of showing that the
nature of the defect wa.s such that it probably was a
manufacturing defeot. The court said :
"As we have previously stated, there is no
evidence of the nature of the defect, what caused
the defect or that the defect existed when it ldt
the hands of the defendant.
"The plaintiff has not sustained his burden
of proof and judgment should be entered for the
defendant.' 307 F. Supp. at 291.
Nor are we given the benefit of the qualifications
of the phantom expert. Rule 56( e) provides with re>spect to motion for summary judgment, of which thrsP
proceedings are kin, as follows :
"Supporting and opposing affidavits shall hP
made on personal knowledge, shall sPt forth such
facts as would be
in evidflnC<\ and
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therPin.''
Plaintiffs' "Offer of Proof'' does not even idPntify
· the area of the expert's expertise to say nothing of
his competency. It falls far short of even minimum
requirements.
Finally, it should be pointed out that it iR admitted
in the original complaint that plaintiff Clifford F.
Parker discovered the alleged defect (R. 1). This fact
22

alone would insulate defendant General Motors Corporation from liability for that defect even if it were
a cause of the accident and even if it existed ait the
time of manufacture.
The doctrine of Strict Liability in Tort has no
application where the alleged defect is discovered.
Greenmam v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., supra, acknowledges that liability exists only for defects of which the
purchaser is not aware. The statement of the Greenman
case is:
"To Pstablish the manufacturer's liabilHy it
was sufficient that plaintiff proved that he was
injured while using the Shopsmith in a way it
was intended to be used as a result of a defect
in design and manufacture of which plaintiff was
not aware that made the Shopsmith unsafe for
its intended use." (Italics added).
See also Leininger v. Sterns-Roger Mat/!lt.facturing
Co., 17 Utah 2d 37, 404 P.2d 33 (1965), whPre this
court said:
"Upon this discovery by Texas Zinc of the
concealed danger inherent in its exhaust fans,
its responsibility superseded that of the defendant contractor .
''
Also holding t11at for a person to recover under
thf' rulP of strict liahility for a defect in manufactured
product, that person must not be aware of the defect,
are Magnuson v. Rnpp Manufacturing, Inc., 171 N.W. 2d
201 (Minn. 1969), BPnnett v. International Shoe, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 318 (1969) and Mans v. Dreher, 10 Ariz. App. 520,
460 P.2d 191 (1969).

The Amended Complaint in this ease rPally says
nothing more than this: The plaintiffs sustained injurirs
while occupying or being struck by an automohile
primary electrical system malfunctioned. This is immfficient.
"His well settled that mere proof of an injnry
to plaintiff will not justify a verdict or jndgirn•nt
imposing liability upon the defendant and if tlu•
evidence does not show .any negligPnce on thl'
part of the defendant, there can he no recovery,
regardless of the fact that plaintiff was not nPgligent." Hewitt v.
Tire cf Rubber CJo.,
3 Utah 2d 354, 284 P.2d 471, 472 (1955 ).

POINT II. PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT
FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE
GRANTED FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY.

The allegations of the Amended Complaint rt>lating to express warranty incorporatP the allegatiom;
relating to the doctrine of strict liability and state, in
addition, that defendant General l\fotors Corporation
through its written guarantee and advertisements l'Xpressly and impliedly warranted that it was of merchantable quality. (R. 1078).
These allegations are nothing more than assertion:-;
that by offering the automobile for sale defendant Grneral Motors Corporation represented that it was suitable
for the general uses to which automobiles are ordinarily
put.
The claims based upon warranty suffer from tlH'
same fatal defect as the claim based upon the doctrine
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of Strict Liability in Tort, namely, there is no causal
relation between the alleged defects rendering the car
unrnerchan table and the accident.
And, as to the claims based upon warranty, there
is the additional infirmity created by the limitations
contained in the express warranty upon which the plaintiffs rely.
In their brief the plaintiffs adopt the statement of
defendant General Motors Corporation set forth in its
Memorandum of Authorities filed in the District Court
in support of its Motion to Dismiss. (R. 147, Brief of
Plaintiffs-Appellants, p. 19). The warranty extended
by defendant General Motors Corporation was to the
effect that the> automohilt- was:
"CF'ree} from defects in material and workmanship under nonnal use and service; Cadillac
Motor Car Division's obligation under this warranty being limited to repairing or replacing at
its option any part or parts thereof which shall,
within 24 months ... , or 24,000 miles whichever
event shall first occur ... "

Following this quotation in the Memorandum of
AuthoritiPs is this statP11wnt:
"Indeed, the express warranty is expressly
in lieu of any other warranties express or implied,
including any implied warranty or merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose." (R. 147 ).
In the Annotation "Construction and Effect of
Standard New Motor VPhicfo Warranty." 99 A.L.R. 2d
1419 (ln65), it is said that if the manufacturer's stand-
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ard new motor vehicle warranty is niaJe :t i'c 1' of the
contract in the sale of a motor vehicle, tlw uhLgation
of the seller is determined solely by the tPrms of such
warranty, and that warranty, by its express terms, precludes the purchaser's reliance upon any other grounds
of liability.
The Manufacturer's Standard New Motor Vehicle
Warranty was approved and held not in conflict with
$e Uniform Sales Act in Knecht v. Universal Motor
Co., 113 N.W. 2d 688 (N.D. 1962).
The law of Utah is to the same effect. In Wasatch
Orchard Co. v. Morgan Canning Co., 89 P. 1009 (Utah
1907), suit was brought for the balance due for the sale
of 200,000 cans guaranteed by the plaintiff to b0 suitable
for canning peas and that not over 4 cans per thousand
would be defective. The defendant claimed that 24-,000
cans and contents were lost because the cans w0re not
of sufficient strength and were not properly tested. At
the trial the court charged the jury that the def Pndan t
had the right to recover all damages sustained by reason
of breach of warr:anty. It was urged that an irnplif>d
warranty may arise notwithstanding an express one
where it relates to different subject matter and the implied warranty had been expressly excluded. Justice
Strapp speaking for the court held to the contrary,
saying:
"When a vendor and vendee have hy an express
contract stipulated as to the guarantee of quality,
the guarantee of quality is to be measured by that
contract. If not, what is the purpose of giving the
parties the right to contract on the
The
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parties have the undoubted right to restrict the
guarantee of quality to defects of cans in excess
of four to each thousand manifested during processing, and to condition it upon a return of
such cans to plaintiff's factory, and to limit the
liability to the cost price of the cans, or to contract that there should be no guarantee whatever.
They have here, by an agreement between them,
expressed the warranty of quality, its nature
and character the price to be paid upon the failure
thereof, and the conditions upon which such payments were to be made. By doing so, they have
expressed themselves with respect to obligations
created by an implied warranty on the same
subject-matter of quality, and the implied obligations are necessarily excluded by those expressed.''
The modern "n'fonners" of our legal structure who
scoff at cases decided prior to 1960 doubtless look upon
the Wasatch Orchard case with the inh•rest of collectors
of antiquef;. The logic of that case, however, is still
sound and was found compelling to this court in Redmond v. Petty Motor Company, 121 Utah 370, 242 P.2d
302 (1952), wlwre this court approved and
a
non-warranty provision providing:

"It is further understood and agreed that ...

no representations or warranties express or implif'd, have bf'en madf' except those which are
set forth in this agreement; that purchaser hereby
waives any and all claim against the seller growing out of any representation or warranties not
specifically set forth herein . . ."
See also Landes & Co. v. Fallows, 81 Utah 432, 19
P.2d 38D (1933) and Hoover r. Utah Nu.rsitig Co., 79
1Ttah 12, 7 P.2d :no (1932).
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POINT III. PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT FAILS TO
STATE A CLAIM UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA
LOQUITUR.

Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint allegrs as its "Second Cause of Action" that the defective conditions S(,t
forth in the "First Cause of Action" made tht> automohi I<·
dangerous to persons and property while it was heingoperated upon highways and freeways, that the dPf Pc1ti_ve conditions were caused by the negligence of both
defendants or that the Cadillac automobile was in th('
exclusive control of the defendants at the time of thP
negligence, that plaintiffs do not have knowledge of th0
precise acts of negligence, that the type of def Pcts eansing the accident alleged above do not normally occur
in the absence of negligence and that defendant, G0neral Motors Corporation, having manufactured and d0signed said automobile and the Defendant, Owen Wrip;ht,
Inc., having worked on said automobile are in a supPrior
position to explain the defects than the plaintiffs.
The trial courit held that the doctrine of res 1psa
loquitur was not available to the plaintiffs und0r tlw
circumstances of this case. In that decision the trial
court had ample support in -the authorities.
The elements of the doctrine were set forth in
Wightmam v. MoU1Y1,tain Fuel Supply Comparwy, 5 Utah
2d 373, 302 P .2d 471 ( 1956), in this language :
"In order to invoke this doctrine that is gPnerally recognized that the following elements nrnst
be present: (1) That the accident was of a kind
which in 1the ordinary course of events, would
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not havP happern·<l had due ean· h1·P11 11h:s1·ryprl;
(2) That it happened irn·spPetiw· of'
parti1·ipation by the plaintiff; and ( 3) That the cause
thereof was something under thP management or
control of the defendant, or for which it is responsible."
St>P ah.;o Loos v. Mowntain Fnel Supply Co., 99 Ptah
496, 108 P.2d 254 (1940); JfiUigan v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 11 Ptah 2d 30, 354 P.2d 580 (lfWO); Barnhill 1
Young Electric Sign Co., 13 Utah 2d 347, 374 P.2d 311
(1962); Josrph v. W. H. Grovrs L.D.S. Hospital, 10
Utah 2d 94, 348 P.2d 935 (1960).
1

•

Where the instrumentality alleged to have caused
the injury is under the control of the injured party ait
thP tinw of the R('CidPnt tlw doctrinr (•an havt> no application.
ln Matiet·ifr'h r. Hcrcufrs Pmrder
LTtah
2d 283, 282 P.2d 1044 (1955), the plaintiff was employed
hy a cement company as a powder man and was injnrPd
when a cap and sti<'k of dynamih• of dt>f<>ndant's mannfach1r<> exploded as hP placPd thPrn in a <lrillPd hole.
ThPre was no PvidPnce as to how or why
1'xploded,
nonP as to when or how Pithl r of thPm was manufactured, and none as to how or hy whom t.hPy had heen
handlPd or tr<>atP<l prior to their usP, rx<·<>pt as plaintiff himself handlPd th Pm ( whrt her ea re fully or not)
in a manner other than as rpcommernl1•<1 hy instructions
which accompaniPd the
in which thPy wrre
packaged.
1

The court. said:
"'Plaintiff urges that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is applicable. under the circumstancPs
recited. We carn:;10t agree. To do so would be to
impose absolute liability and insurability upon
manufacturers of explosives and perhaps most
any other commodity. To do so would be to
extend the fact or fiction of control necessary to
invoke the doctrine to an unreasonable,
:tical and unrealistic degree, where mere injury
could dispense with plaintiff's burden of prov. ing a defendant's negligence, even where it would
be impossible for defendant to show freedom
therefrom. We never have presumed to extt>nd
the doctrine to such an area, and prefer to adhen'
fo the principles enunciated in 22 Am. Jur. 212,
Sec. 95 to the effect that the mere happenstance
of an explosion does not create a presumption
of negligence and where it is further stated at
p. 213 in language quite applicable to the facts of
this case, that:
' • • • If causes other than the negligence of the defendant might haYe produced
the accident, the plaintiff is bound to exelndP
the operation of such causes by a fair pn'ponderance of the evidence.'" 282 P.2d at
1045

In Polly Chin Sugai v. General Motors Corporation,
137 F. Supp. 696 (D. Idaho 1956), the plaintiffs alleged
that decedent purchased a 1952 Cadillac manufactured
bJ7; General Motors Corporation from defendant Logsdon
Motor Company in July, 1952, that the automobile was
manufactured and :that, as a proximate result
thereof, the left rear wheel and brake assembly failed,
on October 14, 1952, while decedent was driving
1
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Cadillac, that the malfunction of the left rear wheel and
brake assembly caused said wheel to lock, that the automobile thereupon went out of control, veered from the
highway, hurtled over a ditch and fence and roll Pd over.
Plaintiffs admitted that they had no specific evidence that the brake mechanism failed or that the left
rear wheel locked. Plaintiffs' evidence disclosed only
that the automobile left a single skid mark on the highway for a distance of 190-200 feet, and that the left
rear tire had a flat spot six to nine inches in length
and approximately one-eighth of an inch deep.
Quoting from an Idaho Supreme Court decision the
con rt said:
''When• it rPrnains equally probable from a
consideration of all the i>videnee, that the injury
resulted from the cause sug-gPsted by the def(>ndant, as from that suggestL>d by the plaintiff, the
plaintiff has not established his cas(>. [Citing
cases.} Circumstances which are merely consistent with liability are insufficient [Citing
(Italics add.-d.) 137 F. Supp. at 699.
In r<>sponse to the plaintiffs' reliance upon res ipsa
loquitur the court said:
"The instant case does not come within the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The Supreme Court
of Idaho defined the doctrine in lVilson r. St.
Joe Boom Co., Ltd., 34 Idaho 253, 268, 200 P.
884, 888 as follows:
'We think that the dortrinP of res ipsa.
loquitur which literally means "the
tion speaks for itself,'' and is m.-relv a wav
of saying that. thP eircnmstancf'S attenda1;t

:n

upon an accident are of
o.f s':1ch
a character as fo justify a jury m mferr111g
negligence as the cause of the accidt::•nt, is
applicable where an injury arises from some
condition or thing that is in its very natun•
so obviously destructive to person or property, and is so tortious in its quality, as t.o
permit of no inference save that of negligence on the part of the person in control
of the injurious agency. • • •" (Italics
added.)
"See also Warner v. Pittsburgh-Idaho Co.,
Ltd., 38 Idaho 254, 262, 220 P. 492, 494; Ma.rt in v.
Brown, 56 Idaho 379, 382, 54 P.2d 1157, 1158. The
automobile was not under the control of defendants, but was being driven by the plaintiffs' decedent at the time of the aceident. Plaintiff Polly
Chin Sugai, moreover, had owned this automobile for three months and had driven the same for
more than 2,000 miles.''
In this case the most reasonable inference is that
the driver was negligent, making res ipsa loquitur applicable, if at all, against the plaintiffs' position. In llarfsell v. Hickman, 148 F. Supp. 782 (W. D. Ark. 1957), a
fare-paying passenger sued a driver for injuries arising
when the operated car left the highway and rolled ovPr.
The defendant stated that the right front wheel appeared
to lock causing his loss of control and moved to
the re s ipsa allegation struck from the pleading and
for summary judgment on the issue of negligence.
1

The coul"t said :
"The Court agrees with plaintiff's contention
that this is a proper case for the application of
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The plaintiff was
asleep and while the defendant had cornpletP con32

trol and management of the automobile, it for
some reason turned over and caused certain injuries of which plaintiff complains. No other vehicle
was involved in the accident. Thus, all the elt>ments necessary for the application of the res
ipsa loquitur doctrine are present, i.e., the defendant had complete control and managrment
of th<' vehicle; the accident was such that would
not occur in the ordinary course of evf'nts if the
driver were using proper care; and the record
before the Court tends to show negligence on
the part of the defendant and no one else."
By the samf' reasoning, if the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is applicable in this ease, it is applicahll' against
plaintiff Parker, thf' driv1•r of fop automobile, not the
defend an ts.

<'ONCLUSION
The doctrine of Strict Liability m Tort is not and
should not become the law of Utah by the decision in
this case. That doctrine finds support among those
who look only from the consumers' point of view but
its primary impact is directed against sellns and it
would, therefore, have its greatest impact upon the local
economy. To say that its impaet c.an be shifted by insurance is naive. Wl1en thP cost of insurance is considerffi,
lossf's covered by insurance are greater, not lesser, than
uninsured losses.
If such fundamental changes in the legal structure
are to be accomplished on grounds of public policy, they
should he made by the lf'hrislatur<>, not hy tlw courts.
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But .in no event should this case be a vehicle for
such change. In this case the foots pleaded and the
"Offer of Proof" negate liability under. any modern
theory of jurisprudence.
·

Respectfully submitted,
WORSLEY, SNOW &
CHRISTENSEN AND
HAROLD G. CHRISTENSEN
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